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Fairness in 
Book Fund Allocation 
Jasper G. Schad 
Efforts to improve book fund allocations have generally focused on developing better formulas, 
or models, that utilize quantitative measures to determine how the budget will be divided 
among various subjects. Librarians are attracted to the seemingly rational approach of formu-
las, but their potential to provide better allocations is limited by the environment in which 
allocation decisions are made in academic libraries. This environment is characterized by scarce 
resources, conflicting departmental goals, and a virtually infinite number of factors that affect 
the need for library resources. Each one of these considerations stimulates deep concern about 
the fairness and equity of allocations. Research on how recipients view their allocations and the 
process by which they are made offers insights that can help library administrators and collec-
tion developers to manage the allocation process more effectively. 
llocating book funds in aca 
demic libraries should be a ra-
tional exercise in making effec-
tive and responsible use of the 
acquisitions budget. All too often, how-
ever, extraneous factors work against 
such an outcome. Schad recognized the 
political nature of the problem, 1 and John-
son and Rutstein vividly described how 
departments work to protect or increase 
their share of the budget. 2 These papers 
brought to light an important dimension 
of the fund allocation problem but one 
that is only part of a much larger picture. 
The intensity with which individual fac-
ulty members and whole departments 
sometimes approach fund allocation rep-
resents something more than just trying to 
capture a larger share of the budget. Both 
the outcome and the process stir powerful 
emotions and generate deep feelings 
about fairness, equity, and justice. 3 As . 
early as 1953, Thornton realized that eq-
uity is an important consideration in the 
allocation process. 4 McGrath, Hunt-
singer, and Barber also mentioned eq-
uity.5 More recently, Bentley and Farrell 
saw the need for fairness. 6 None of these 
papers, however, explored the concepts 
of equity and fairness further. 
To understand why equity and fairness 
are so important, one needs only to exam-
ine briefly the environment in which allo-
cation decisions are made. It is an environ-
ment characterized by scarcity, dissensus, 
and complexity. Scarcity lowers outcomes 
and requires people to make sacrifices. A 
low outcome alone may not create a prob-
lem, but an unfairly low outcome does. 
Normally, people do not worry much 
about fairness. If there is enough money 
in the book budget to buy what faculty 
members want, they are unlikely to be 
particularly concerned about how the 
budget is administered. When budgets 
decline and acquisitions drop, however, 
the same faculty members are likely to pay 
a great deal of attention to the issue of fair-
ness and to scrutinize spending and allo-
cating carefully in order to detect any sign 
of unfairness. Scarcity also increases the 
probability of unfairness by stimulating 
competition and self-interest. Dissensus 
flourishes in organizations that have no 
strong central authority and no common 
set of goals. This kind of environment is 
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not unusual in higher education. Colleges 
and universities are often made of funda-
mentally autonomous departments 
whose objectives are varied, conflicting, 
.and changing. It is not even certain that all 
departments see themselves as engaged 
in a joint enterprise. The existence of com-
peting values renders attempts to forge an 
institutional perspective all but impos-
sible.7 Even worse, the library can easily 
become an arena in which battles resulting 
from institutional discord are fought. 
Complexity, because it usually increases 
uncertainty, is the third element that 
heightens concerns about fairness. 
Scarcity, dissensus, and complexity and 
the concerns about fairness they generate 
are the principal reasons why allocators 
like quantifiable formulas. They argue 
that formulas enhance the limitations of 
human cognitive powers and assist them 
in choosing from among many alterna-
tives the one that optimizes the effective-
ness of the book budget. In practice, how-
ever, librarians are more realistic. They 
recognize the limits of formulas but still 
defend them on the grounds that they ap-
pear fairer and that faculty are more will-
ing to accept formula-based allocations. 8 
In other words, librarians see formulas as 
a technique or strategy for defending 
themselves against challenges to the fair-
ness and equity of allocations. It is impor-
tant, probably necessary, to convince fac-
ulty members and departments that their 
allocations are fair. The question is 
whether a formula is the best way to go 
about that task. It certainly is one possible 
strategy, but research on what social psy-
chologists call distributive justice9 suggests 
that other ways are more likely to yield 
better results. 
Distributive justice is concerned with al-
locating resources fairly. There are many 
theories, all of which share a basic 
concept-individuals scrutinize their allo-
cations in relation to those of others and 
the process by which they were made. 
When they appear reasonable, the alloca-
tions seem fair. If not, injustice is per-
ceived. The way individuals react to allo-
cations that they regard as unfair is termed 
retributive justice. Both the distributive and 
retributive aspects of allocating book 
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funds are closely related. They can be sep-
arated in theory but not in practice. This 
paper examines the theories and research 
on distributive and retributive justice in 
terms of how the book fund allocation pro-
cess can be improved. 
" ... individuals apply their own 
particular standards of fairness, 
which is to say that fairness cannot be 
measured against a single, absolute 
principle." 
In judging allocations, individuals ap-
ply their own particular standards of fair-
ness, which is to say that fairness cannot 
be measured against a single, absolute 
principle. It is pretty much what people 
think it is. The same allocation may seem 
fair to A but unfair to B. So long as differ-
ent observers regard each other's inputs, 
outputs, and needs as being of unequal 
value, disagreements are inevitable. Per-
ceived unfairness triggers feelings of an-
ger and efforts to secure restitution. One 
reason for the impact of retributive justice 
being so powerful is that emotions acceler-
ate toward infinity as the situation wors-
ens, whereas they decelerate only to zero 
as conditions improve.10 Interestingly, ev-
idence suggests that partially correcting 
an injustice may not help; it may only in-
tensify discontent by recognizing the orig-
inal injustice. 11 
Victims try to restore psychological or 
actual equity. Exactly how they go about 
it, however, varies from individual to indi-
vidual and according to the circumstances 
of the situation.12 Reactions also depend 
on how persons weigh the costs and bene-
fits of various approaches. When there is 
no hope for redressing an injustice, for ex-
ample, people are not likely to complain 
forever. 13 
JUSTICE PRINCIPLES 
Outcomes are not the only concern of re-
cipients: how the principles and proce-
dures that shape outcomes are perceived 
are no less important. If allocators andre-
cipients are to regard an allocation as fair, 
they must agree on three things: 
1. Principles that guide _allocation deci-
sions; 
2. Measures that are used in applying 
those principles; 
3. Procedures that are followed. 
Even though building consensus on these 
principles, measures, and procedures is 
time-consuming, difficult, and likely to be 
only partially successful, it is still worth 
the effort, because an allocation that is 
perceived as fair will be more acceptable. 
Three principles-need, contributions, 
and equality-may serve as the basis for 
an allocation. 14 Whether or not the alloca-
tion process consciously adopts one of 
these principles, it will be governed by 
one or a combination of them. 
The principle of need specifies that 
funds be distributed according to the par-
ticular requirements of each discipline. 
This principle serves institutions that re-
gard the benefits to some departments as 
more important than the loss to others. 
Colleges or universities seeking to foster 
the development and welfare of key de-
partments will find the needs principle at-
tractive. It may also be used to enhance or 
sustain departments that are developing, 
expanding, or even experiencing enroll-
ment drops (yet still need as much as a 
healthy, established department). 
The principle of contributions stipulates 
that funds be apportioned on the basis of 
the degree to which each department 
serves the institutional mission. Colleges 
or universities employing this principle 
regard departments that contribute J?OSt 
to the mission as making the best use of 
funds and deserving a larger share of the 
budget. The contributions principle repre-
sents an economic approach, in that what 
a department receives is output-
governed. A formulation of this principle 
states a relationship between each depart-
ment's productivity and the resources it 
receives, the assumption being that inputs 
are related to outputs and that a larger al-
location enables it to produce more. 
Which output measures a college or uni-
versity prefers will depend on its mission. 
Research universities may prefer pub-
lished research, graduate credit-hour pro-
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duction, and interlibrary loan transac-
tions. Teaching institutions may favor 
student credit hours and circulation fig-
ures. 
The principle of equality affords each re-
cipient an equal share, regardless of differ-
ences in need or output. Because this prin-
ciple does not specify exactly what should 
be equalized, it can be interpreted to mean 
that departments receive the same total 
amoune5 or the same amount for each 
unit, say, the number of faculty members 
or majors. The principle of equality is 
more likely than that of contributions to 
use input rather than output measures. 
Preference for one or more of these dis-
tribution principles depends on a variety 
of factors-institutional and individual. 
Institutional characteristics favoring one 
principle or another include the size of the 
college or university and the level of com-
petition on a particular campus. Imper-
sonal and competitive environments (typ-
ically found at large schools) are more 
likely to favor the contributions principle. 
Cooperative environments (typically 
found at smaller institutions) are more in-
clined toward equality. Where avoiding 
conflict is a paramount concern, equality 
will be preferred, because it avoids the 
need to make judgments about the rela-
tive merit of individuals or departments. 16 
Put another way, friends, associates, or 
individuals who know one another (that 
is, have relationships with a past and a fu-
ture) are more likely to divide resources 
evenly and to benefit the other even at 
their own expense. 17 Such relationships 
strengthen adherence to rules of behavior 
that resemble a social contract. 
Colleges and universities, however, are 
seldom so monolithic that a single or even 
a dominant principle can govern the allo-
cation process. Departments and individ-
ual faculty members have their own goals, 
and they will defend principles that place 
them at an advantage. 18 In most cases, 
some balance among the three will have to 
·be maintained. Even then, circumstances 
and participants frequently change. As 
departments evolve, so do their ideas 
about what is needed for their well-being, 
and their preferences may change. What-
ever degree of consensus exists at one 
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point in time is likely to break down 
quickly. 19 
Individual or personal factors are more 
difficult to assess. Generally, the contribu-
tions principle seems fairest to most peo-
ple, 20 but individual preference for justice 
norms is highly variable. 21 Even though 
individuals want to regard themselves as 
just, they adopt justice principles primar-
ily in terms of what is in their own best in-
terest. Because they want to deserve what 
they get, they need approval by others. 
For that reason, people usually work 
within certain boundaries. Rather than di-
rectly seeking more resources, they select 
and argue for the distributive principle en-
titling them to the largest share of funds 
being allocated and try to convince others 
to accept it. 22 Their arguments may be 
couched in phrases alluding to fairness, 
but such language is only a thin veneer 
over an underlying effort to exploit these 
principles for self-serving ends.23 
Predictably, weak and powerful depart-
ments act differently. Weak departments 
are likely to argue for equality or need. 
Their more powerful counterparts do not 
use power unilaterally to maximize their 
own outcomes, 24 rather, they develop ar-
guments (usually for the contributions 
rule) to buttress their right to receive a 
larger share of the budget. They do get 
more resources, although they do notal-
ways have their way and receive every-
thing due them by the contributions rule, 
and frequently agree to an allocation that 
is intermediate between contributions and 
equality. 25 
"Even though individuals want tore-
gard themselves as just, they adopt 
justice principles primarily in terms 
of what is in their own best interest.'' 
The way participants view themselves 
and the process also affects their choice of 
prinicples. Allocators who believe that 
their ability to control the process results 
from chance are more likely to favor equal-
ity than are those who see themselves as 
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having earned the right to make such a de-
cision. Put another way, people whore-
gard themselves as more deserving favor 
the contributions principle. 26 
Despite extensive research, however, 
no comprehensive theory specifies which 
principle will be best for a particular situa-
tion, although it is possible to make some 
general predictions. Contributions is 
probably the most disruptive principle be-
cause it conflicts with generally accepted 
academic norms. It implies that different 
participants do not have the same value 
and tends to reinforce already strong de-
partments by giving them the resources 
necessary to maintain or extend their ad-
vantage. Contributions-based allocations 
may also be incompatible with the kind of 
open decision-making process that is typi-
cal in higher education. Preference for the 
contributions principle declines when de-
cisions are made openly and increases 
when they are made secretly. 27 
The principle of need has considerable 
appeal in cases where departments are 
undergoing change (especially decline) 
and where fostering personal develop-
ment is a common goal. Scarcit~ also 
seems to favor the needs principle. 28 The 
equality principle is even more congenial 
to higher education because it generally 
supports relationships of mutual respect. 
People who work together regularly and 
share similar values like it. 29 These find-
ings suggest that small liberal arts colleges 
will favor equality, whereas larger, more 
diverse and anonymous universities will 
be more inclinec;l toward contributions. 
Yet, in the last analysis, the complex na-
ture of institutions and individuals is so 
varied and diverse that no single principle 
is likely to satisfy all participants. 
FAIRNESS RULES 
No matter how difficult it is to agree on 
allocation principles, people are more 
likely to achieve consensus on principles 
than on how they should be applied. 30 The 
way principles are implemented deter-
mines how much each fund gets or, more 
bluntly, whose ox will be gored. Under-
standably, procedures will be subject to 
careful scrutiny. The appearance of fair-
ness in the allocation process can be as im-
portant as actual fairness. Procedural fair-
ness helps to neutralize concerns about 
outcomes. There are six procedural 
rules-consistency, bias-suppression, ac-
curacy, correctability, representativeness, 
and ethicality. 31 
1. The consistency rule mandates that 
procedures be uniform over time. All par-
ticipants must follow the same proce-
dures, which must be applied to all recipi-
ents. Once standards are established, 
frequent, sudden, or marked deviation 
from them constitutes a violation of fair 
procedure. Likewise, procedures that 
have been in place for some time are likely 
to be taken for granted and raise few ques-
tions, regardless of how fair they may or 
may not be. 
2. The bias-suppression rule obliges in-
dividuals to exclude personal or depart-
mental self-interest from allocation deci-
sions; one should not serve as judge of 
one's own case. Failure to separate the ad-
versarial and judicial roles raises ques-
tions about fairness. 
3. The accuracy rule specifies that allo-
cations should be based on good informa-
tion and informed opinion. Additionally, 
safeguards are necessary to ensure that 
data are not used opportunistically to en-
hance one's allocation. 
4. The correctability rule requires pro-
cedures to remedy oversights and errors. 
The perception of fairness will be en-
hanced where avenues of appeal permit 
modifying decisions. Any barrier that pre-
vents dissatisfied individuals from seek-
ing redress reduces the perceived level of 
fairness. 
5. The representativeness rule dictates 
that allocations must reflect the basic con-
cerns, values, and outlooks of all depart-
ments. If a group is involved in develop· 
ing or reviewing an allocation, it must 
represent every important segment 
within the institution. 
6. The ethicality rule stipulates that al-
location procedures must be fundamen-
tally moral and ethical. 
As with other fairness issues, individ-
uals apply these rules selectively. De-
pending on the circumstances, one rule 
may be more important than another; or 
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several rules may apply, some of which 
are contradictory or incompatible. To il-
lustrate, consider the question of whether 
allocations should be made by individuals 
or by groups. The argument can be made 
either way. Consensual decisions seem 
fairer, because of the representatives rule. 
People believe that groups protect them 
because no individual or dominant coali-
tion can impose its preference and disre-
gard the group as a whole. Such is not al-
ways the case, however; where there is a 
high degree of uncertainty, a dominant 
majority and pressure for quick decisions, 
differing points of view are often sup-
pressed. 
The amount of available information af-
fects the way groups make decisions and 
how those decisions appear to others. Sit-
uations in which there is a great deal of in-
formation and certainty are less likely to 
appear to violate the accuracy rule than 
are those in which there is a lot of uncer-
tainty. By its very nature, however, the 
book fund allocation problem is character-
ized by uncertainty and by having no ob-
viously correct solution. As the level of 
uncertainty rises, the degree of consensus 
necessary to obtain group agreement de-
clines. In other words, minority opinions 
have more influence in complex allocation 
situations than they do in simple ones.32 
Thus, in an uncertain environment, com-
mittees must be especially careful not to 
violate or disregard the bias-suppression 
and accuracy rules. 
11 
• • • in an uncertain environment, 
committees must be especially care-
ful not to violate or disregard the 
bias-suppression and accuracy 
rules." 
Finally, there is one other potential diffi-
culty with committees. Some committees 
are reluctant to deviate from established 
procedures. Others, however, especially 
those that experience frequent changes in 
membership that bring different perspec-
tives and commitments, often tinker with 
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allocations. 33 In so doing, they ignore the 
consistency rule. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite extensive research, scholars 
have yet to organize their findings into a 
comprehensive theory that predicts pre-
cisely how people will react ,to specific 
events and outcomes and, therefore, ex-
actly how to develop an allocation process 
for a given library. Moreover, existing re-
search is limited in two important ways. 
Most studies afford participants more in-
formation than people receive in real-life 
situations, and they are conducted in en-
vironments where allocators and recipi-
ents are strangers. 34 
Knowing more and not having to live 
with the consequences of a decision can 
produce experimental results much differ-
ent from actual behaviors. Given such dif-
ferences, the value of distributive-justice 
research is largely speculative and intui-
tive. The relationship between competi-
tion and scarcity illustrates this point. 
Scarcity encourages competition, and 
competition leads allocators to favor their 
own departments. Put another way, de-
partmental loyalties are likely to override 
broader concerns for fairness when com-
petition becomes intense. 35 Despite this 
relationship between scarcity and compe-
tition, the most powerful impact is largely 
indirect. What heightens competition 
most of all is the perception of a finite sum 
of money to allocate. 
A budget that contains only so many 
dollars means that department A's gain is 
department B's loss.36 In other words, it is 
a zero-sum game, but the process would 
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be better if it were not seen that way. Allo-
cations that award departments percent-
ages of the budget emphasize the gain-
loss relationship. Allocations that earn 
departments volumes suggest the deserv-
ingness of each department, irrespective 
of all others. Obviously, the budget is still 
the same, but it may help to focus atten-
tion on what is often the real problem-
inadequate funding-and not on whether 
a particular department increases its share 
of the budget by a percentage point or 
two. 
Finally, this caveat-creating feelings of 
fairness may not necessarily produce a 
good allocation. Formulas serve as a case 
in point. They are attractive mainly be-
cause they seem fair. The inherent danger 
is that they can become a kind of quasi-
fairness that is an end in itself. Exactly the 
same risk exists with distributive justice. 
These principles and rules can be used 
simply to manipulate participants. De-
spite that possibility, the fact remains that 
a good allocation stands a poor chance of 
being accepted if the rules of fairness are 
violated. Even under the best of circum-
stances, allocation decisions are often 
heavily influenced by extraneous factors, 
such as campus politics and power. Rec-
ognizing that these distorting influences 
can never be completely eliminated, an 
understanding of the principles and rules 
of distributive justice and how they can be 
applied enables librarians to avoid many 
pitfalls.lt afford them insight into the allo-
cation problem and a wider array of op-
tions for managing the process in order to 
achieve a fairer and more acceptable out-
come. 
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